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In this paper, a few basic notions stemming from information theory are presented 
with the intention of modeling the abstraction of relevant information in categorization 
tasks. In a categorization task, a single output variable is the basis for performing a 
dichotomic classiﬁcation of objects that can be distinguished by a set of input variables 
which are more or less informative about the category to which the objects belong. At 
the beginning of the experiment, the target classiﬁcation is unknown to learners who 
must select the most informative variables relative to the class in order to succeed in 
classifying the objects efﬁciently. I ﬁrst show how the notion of entropy can be used to 
characterize basic psychological processes in learning. Then, I indicate how a learner 
might  use  information  gain  and  mutual  information  –both  based  on  entropy–  to 
efﬁciently  induce  the  shortest  rule  for  categorizing  a  set  of  objects.  Several  basic 
classiﬁcation tasks are studied in succession with the aim of showing that learning can 
improve  as  long  as  subjects  are  able  to  compress  information.  Referring  to  recent 
experimental results, I indicate in the Conclusion that these notions can account for 
both strategies and performance in subjects trying to simplify a learning process. 
 
 
 Information  theory  is  aimed  at  quantifying  data  that 
needs to be stored or communicated (Shannon, 1948). It was 
extensively  used  in  psychology  in  the  1950s  and  1960s, 
especially  for  measuring  the  maximal  amount  of 
information  that  can  be  transmitted  by  subjects  without 
error  (the  reader  will  ﬁnd  historical  presentations  of  this 
approach  in  Attneave,  1959;  Coombs,  Dawes,  &  Tversky, 
1970). In one of Psychological Review’s most cited articles, 
Miller (1956) presented absolute-judgment experiments with 
a  large  variety  of  tasks  and  showed  that  human  subjects 
performing  unidimensional  categorizations  could  not 
discriminate a set of stimuli using more than about seven 
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categories. For instance, subjects could correctly match a set 
of audible sounds (varying continuously from 11 dB to 60 
dB) to a set of ﬁve predeﬁned categories (11-20 dB, 21-30 dB, 
31-40 dB, 41-50 dB, and 51-60 dB). However, if the number 
of  categories  increased  beyond  seven,  subjects  were  no 
longer able to perfectly match the stimuli to the categories. 
In  the  terms  used  in  information  theory,  transmitters 
(subjects) are not able to perfectly communicate the original 
message (the correct category, theoretically associated to a 
sound  they  receive)  to  a  destination  (experimenter)  when 
the number of possible categories is too high. Any amount 
of transmitted information can be measured by computing a 
correlation between the correct categories and the subjects’ 
responses.  When  there  is  no  loss  of  information  in  the 
transmitted  message,  the  correlation  between  the  input 
message and the output message is equal to one; when a 
task  is  too  difﬁcult  for  a  subject,  the  loss  of  information 
shows up as an imperfect correlation between the input and 
the output. However, the amount of information transmitted 
is more commonly measured in bits. This amount can be as   17 
 
 
high as the amount of information present in the original 
message when there is no noise in the message transmitted. 
The following sections show that information theory can 
be used as a broader perspective to shed light on learning 
processes.  Some  aspects  of  the  theory  have  been  used 
implicitly  in  the  past  to  develop  decision-tree  models  in 
psychology, but other aspects, such as mutual information, 
have received less attention but can be effectively brought to 
bear in accounting for some experimental results. 
Entropy 
Information  theory  computes  basic  probabilities  to 
determine the quantity of data a set of messages contains. 
This  quantity,  called  entropy  (or  information  content), 
corresponds to the amount of uncertainty there is in a set of 
messages. For instance, let us imagine that someone wants 
to guess the color of the suit of a playing card picked from a 
regular  deck  (the  suit  is  either  black  or  red).  Because  the 
probability of guessing the color is ½ (half of the cards have 
a  black  suit),  the  communication  of  a  single  piece  of 
information  (e.g.,  black)  is  equal  to  −log2(½)  =  1  bit,  a 
measure which is also called the surprisal. A single message 
(“black” or “red”) corresponds to 1 bit of information in the 
sense that one needs 1 yes-no question to retrieve the color 
(Is the suit red or black?). Corollarily, this means that coding 
the  suit  color  of  the  cards  only  requires  one  binary  digit 
(e.g., 0 if black, 1 if red). A system limited to communicating 
the suit color of a card needs a capacity of 1 bit. If a system 
does not properly communicate the suit color of a card, it 
either may have a capacity of less than 1 bit or be subject to 
unwanted perturbation. The general formula of the surprisal 
is  therefore  simply  −log2(p),  where  p  is  the  probability  of 
obtaining  a  given  response  by  chance.  The  surprisal  is 
maximal when p = .5, because for any other situation where 
the probability of an event approaches 1 or 0, the receiver is 
less surprised by the information transmitted by the sender 
(if a box is ﬁlled with 100 red balls and 0 blue balls, nobody 
would  be  surprised  to  hear  that  the  ball  just  randomly 
drawn from the box is red). 
In the preceding example on absolute judgments about 
sounds, the channel-capacity limit is thought to be about 2.8 
bits because no messages of more than −log2( ) = 2.8 bits can 
be perfectly transmitted (  is the probability of transmitting 
the right category by chance). Because guessing the sound 
category is more difﬁcult than guessing the color of a card, 
the surprisal is higher for sounds (2.8) than for cards (1). By 
describing  human  abilities  in  terms  of  channel  capacity, 
Miller  (1956)  implied  that  overly  demanding  tasks 
(requiring the encoding of more than 2.8 bits) will not be 
handled  by  subjects.  Simultaneously,  Miller  began 
contributing to the decline of information theory by making 
a  distinction  between  bits  of  information  and  chunks  of 
information.1 
The formula for entropy is a little more general than the one 
proposed  above,  because  some  messages  can  be  more 
probable than others. The uncertainty one has about a set of 
possible  messages  (e.g.,  black  or  red,  or  one  of  seven 
categories)  is  called  entropy  or  H.  It  is  determined  by 
computing the expected value2 of the surprisal of all possible 
pieces  of  information  a  message  might  contain:
    (1) 
In  this  formula,  i  indexes  all  possible  messages.  For 
instance,  the  entropy  for  colors  in  a  deck  of  52  cards  is: 
H(color)  =  −p(red)log2(p(red))  −  p(black)log2(p(black))  = 
−( )(−1) − ( )(−1) = .5 + .5 = 1. 
For 7 categories, we have: 
H(category) = −p(cat1)log2(p(cat1)) − p(cat2)log2(p(cat2)) − 
... −p(cat7)log2(p(cat7)) = −( )(−2.8) − ( )(−2.8) − ... − ( )(−2.8)− = 
.4 + .4 + ... + .4 = 2.8. 
In the above two examples, note that the entropy is equal 
to  the  surprisal  of  a  single  message  because  all  messages 
have  the  same  outcomes.3  In  what  follows,  I  show  how 
information entropy can be used to model concept learning. 
Generalities on Concept Learning  
Concepts are abstract ideas that can be used to classify 
objects  on  the  basis  of  their  functions,  shapes,  taste, 
composition,  etc.  Once  acquired,  concepts  can  be  used  to 
generalize from prior experience. The formation of concepts 
can  be  approached  by  studying  child  development,  or  by 
studying the history of ideas over longer periods of time.4 
Another way of obtaining data on concept formation is to 
carry out microgenetic studies to get a ﬁner grained picture 
of  developmental  change.  By  further  reducing  the  time 
window, concept formation can also be scrutinized during a 
single  learning  session.  In  this  case,  which  is  of  primary 
interest  here,  the  cognitive  processes  involved  in  learning 
are  inferred  from  measures  such  as  failure  vs  success, 
number of trials to criterion, number of errors during task 
execution, learning time, response time per trial, etc. Even 
more interesting is the subjective complexity of a given task, 
which can be inferred from the above-mentioned variables, 
with high values most often denoting difﬁculty acquiring a 
concept. 
Concepts  can  be  viewed  as  categorization  situations 
conﬁned  to  two  categories  only  (the  category  of  positive 
examples  versus  the  category  of  negative  examples),  no 
matter how many input dimensions (features) there are. For 
instance,  the  concept  of  zebra  helps  separate  the  positive 
examples (zebras = Equidae with black and white stripes all 
over  the  body)  from  the  negative  examples  (all  other   18 
 
 
animals); the number of legs is not a critical feature in this 
case, whereas being a horse-like animal and having stripes 
are two relevant dimensions. A good deﬁnition of a concept 
(also  called  the  intension)  prevents  one  from  having  to 
memorize  the  list  of  all  positive  examples  (called  the 
extension). 
This  article  deals  with  rule  learning  and  artiﬁcial 
concepts,  ﬁrst  studied  in  the  1950’s  by  Bruner,  Goodnow, 
and  Austin  (1956).  Artiﬁcial  concepts  are  built  by 
experimenters who arbitrarily assign membership to a list of 
stimuli.  Learning  artiﬁcial  categories  imply  quite  different 
processes  from  learning  natural  categories.  In  artiﬁcial 
settings, the informativeness of the dimensions is expected 
to  be  nearly  equivalent  (and  existing  differences  can  be 
controlled  by  randomizing  the  relevant  dimensions), 
whereas  in  natural  categories,  the  dimensions  are  not 
equally informative. Subjects tend to assign different values 
to  dimensions  in  their  natural  conceptualizations.  For 
instance, in the twenty-questions game, a clever strategy is 
to start by asking whether the unknown thing is living, since 
the  answer  to  this  question  eliminates  lots  of  possibilities 
(when young children ask questions that are too speciﬁc, for 
instance, “Is it Mommy?”, a “No” response leaves them with 
very many possibilities). Another difference is that evidence 
for peculiar perception can be shown in natural category-
learning  situations,  provided  the  features  are  sufﬁciently 
continuous.  For  instance,  categorical-perception  behavior 
might  indicate  increased  sensitivity  to  items  of  different 
categories (Goldstone, 1994) as well as decreased sensitivity 
to  items  of  a  similar  category.  In  this  vein,  Wood  (1976) 
showed that adults do not perceive continuously changing 
series of artiﬁcial sounds from b to p but they hear an abrupt 
switch from b to p. In contrast, artiﬁcial category learning 
can be linked to a reasoning process involving the inductive 
formation and deductive testing of logical rules (e.g., if the 
positive examples are big and red and a big red object is 
displayed, then that object is positive). This is especially true 
when  the  number  of  features  is  small,  when  features  are 
discrete, and when categories are not fuzzy. For instance, J. 
D. Smith, Minda, and Washburn (2004) showed that humans 
transcend  slow  association-based  learning  whenever 
possible  and  exhibit  very  sudden  learning  through  rule 
discovery and insight, in comparison to monkeys who learn 
the same tasks via conditioning. 
However, even natural conceptualizations invoke some 
forms of abstraction akin to rule learning: it has been shown 
that  children  do  not  conceptualize  the  world  simply  by 
considering the physical characteristics of objects but also by 
abstracting  theories,  such  as  ”essentialism”  which  they 
incorporate in their biological beliefs. Also, if-then rules can 
be used to form ﬁrst-order logic in order to reason about 
predicates  (if  parent(z,  y)  and  parent(y,  x),  then 
grandparent(z,  x)).  This  is  why  rule-based  models  have  a 
long history (Murphy, 2002). However, other theories refrain 
from  assuming  such  deliberate  high-level  processing  and 
model category learning as an implicit associative learning 
process based on perceived similarities between objects that 
can result from the homogeneity of the categories. There is a 
bulk of evidence for each of these two forms of reasoning 
(that can sometimes work dually, in line with many hybrid 
models),  depending  on  the  design  of  the  categorization 
experiment  (Sloman,  1996).  Note  that  the  experimental 
conditions related in this paper are likely to produce data 
that  appear  to  support  deterministic  rules,  but  similarity-
based  models  are  known  to  perfectly  account  for  many 
results that would be obtained in such conditions in terms of 
pure exemplar-storage schemes (Nosofsky, Gluck, Palmeri, 
McKinley, & Gauthier, 1994). 
Here,  for  the  sake  of  simplicity,  I  focus  on  (1)  stimuli 
built from Boolean dimensions (each taking on two different 
values  only,  like  squares  versus  triangles  for  a  shape 
dimension) and (2) separable dimensions (such dimensions 
can  be  consciously  identiﬁed  and  separated  by  subjects, 
contrary to integral dimensions such as hue and brightness 
in colors, see Garner, 1974; for instance, shapes and colors 
are  simple  separable  dimensions).  When  merging  two 
separable binary-valued dimensions to build a set of simple 
stimuli, one can create four stimuli, that is, a blue square, a 
blue triangle, a red square, and a red triangle, forming what 
is  called  a  training  sample  (also  called  a  block  of  stimuli 
when the stimuli are displayed sequentially). Such canonical 
stimulus  sets  have  been  studied  extensively  since  the 
pioneering work by Shepard, Hovland, and Jenkins (1961). 
Also, and again, for the sake of simplicity, I only focus here 
on supervised learning: the category label is provided to the 
learner  whenever  they  are  wrong,  and  participants 
gradually  learn  the  appropriate  classiﬁcation  by  an  error-
driven process through which they adapt their responses to 
the feedback. Note that supervision necessarily takes place 
during a training phase (as opposed to a test phase, in which 
a new set of stimuli is given to subjects in order to test the 
generalizability of their concepts; in test phases, supervision 
is  not  mandatory).  The  model  presented  here  aims  to 
account for how subjects learn and use a concept during a 
training  phase.  In  classical  experimental  settings,  subjects 
are  required  to  classify  a  set  of  stimuli  displayed 
sequentially. The learner is presented with blocks of stimuli 
in  random  order,  with  each  stimulus  appearing  once. 
Because  learning  is  supervised,  subjects  progressively 
become  able  to  correctly  categorize  the  objects.  In  theory, 
computer simulations imply the same stimulus sets as in the 
experiments run on subjects, but in reality the modeling is   19 
 
 
based on basic formalizations and alleviate the need to do 
simulations. 
There are potentially many different Boolean concepts to 
be  learned,  depending  on  the  number  of  dimensions,  the 
number  of  positive  examples,  and  the  structure  of  the 
categories  (Feldman,  2003).  Our  goal  is  to  account  for 
subjective  complexity  by  investigating  the  learning 
mechanisms involved in such tasks. Most empirical studies 
evaluate the subjective complexity of tasks by measuring the 
number  of  trials  to  criterion  or  the  proportion  of  correct 
responses  for  each  block  of  stimuli  in  the  task,  and  then 
using these measures to compare concepts with each other. 
However,  more  reﬁned  analyses  of  ﬁt  can  be  based  on 
typicality judgments, response times, and proportion correct 
for  each  stimulus  within  a  given  concept  (Lafond, 
Lacouture,  &  Cohen,  2009).  All  of  these  measures  can  be 
predicted from the model I develop here. 
Some Examples of Boolean-Concept Learning Tasks 
Let  us  begin  with  the  example  of  the  exclusive  OR 
(called XOR) structure shown in Figure 1, ﬁrst studied by 
Neisser  and  Weene  (1962),  and  then  used  as  a  canonical 
example in how neural networks perform (Minsky & Papert, 
1969;  Rumelhart,  Hinton,  &  Williams,  1986).  XOR  is 
presented below: 
   
Each column is a variable that can take on the value 0 or 1 
(in such cases, the concepts are called Boolean). The columns 
are  labelled  X,  Y,  and  Z.  The  last  column  represents  the 
category variable and the other columns the input variables. 
This  kind  of  truth  table  is  convenient  for  describing  the 
partitioning of objects (the positive examples are denoted by 
the 1’s in column Z, and the negative examples are denoted 
by 0’s in column Z). The input variables could describe color 
options or size options such as small vs big, blue vs red, etc. 
For instance, the ﬁrst line of the table would indicate that the 
small  (coded  0)  blue  (coded  0)  object  is  not  part  of  the 
positive category (coded 0). The entropy H of each of the 
variables is 1 bit because 1 bit of information is needed to 
store  or  communicate  one  of  the  two  equally  probable 
values (0 or 1) that can be taken on by each variable. More 
formally, we have: 
   
The  question  here  is  how  can  subjects  make  use  of 
information in the input variables to categorize the examples 
in the most efﬁcient manner? I will focus here on strategies 
consistent  with  Occam’s  razor  (1324).  The  idea  is  that 
formulating simpler hypotheses is preferable because such 
hypotheses  generalize  better  (Blumer,  Ehrenfeucht, 
Haussler,  & Warmuth,  1987),  not  mentioning  that  simpler 
hypotheses are less memory-demanding.5 One strategy is to 
start by searching for the most diagnostic variable (if there is 
no  totally  diagnostic  one).  Then,  the  learner  moves  on  to 
choose a second variable to complete the ﬁrst one, and so on, 
until  a  minimal  set  of  variables  are  ordered  in  the  most 
efﬁcient  manner  to  categorize  the  objects.  This  gradual 
strategy is consistent with the idea of abstracting a rule and 
searching  for  exceptions.  A  second  strategy  consists  of 
simultaneously considering the set of input variables in an 
attempt to discover some relationships that might be helpful 
for the categorization process. These two strategies can be 
modeled  respectively  using  two  notions  developed  in 
information  theory:  information  gain  and  mutual 
information. I will show how these notions can account for 
complexity  in  terms  of  compressibility  (I  refer  here  to 
lossless  compression  rather  than  lossy  compression  of 
information).  We  will  see  that  in  that  respect,  XOR  is  a 
difﬁcult concept according to information gain measures but 
a simple concept according to mutual information measures. 
Information gain 
Before  describing  information  gain,  a  concept  simpler 
than XOR should be examined: 
   
In the SIMPLE concept, the variable X is clearly correlated to 
the class Z (contrary to Y, and contrary to both X and Y in 
XOR). Therefore, subjects can use a basic rule such as “IF X = 
1 THEN Z = 1; ELSE Z = 0”. The only difﬁculty for subjects is 
to induce such a rule from the training sample. However, it 
should be pretty obvious for subjects that the two values of 
X are perfectly correlated to the category values, contrary to 
Y. In other terms, the probability of getting the right answers 
by focusing on X is maximal. Subjects only need to turn their 
attention to X to notice its relevance to the task. 
Third example: 
     20 
 
 
Here, when W = 0, the situation is similar to the SIMPLE 
concept,  that  is,  “IF  X  =  1  THEN  Z  =  1;  ELSE  Z  =  0”. 
However, when W = 1, we simply have Z = 1. Intuitively, the 
simplest rule is “IF W = 1 THEN Z = 1; ELSE [IF X = 1 THEN 
Z = 1; ELSE Z = 0]”. This embedded rule corresponds to a 
decision-tree structure in which the value of W is tested ﬁrst, 
and then X is tested whenever W = 0. We can then predict 
the following for stimuli for which W = 1: (1) They will be 
quickly  and  correctly  categorized  by  subjects,  given  that 
subjects  focus  ﬁrst  on  the  most  diagnostic  features  and 
postpone  learning  exceptions,  (2)  they  will  need  only  one 
step to be identiﬁed as positive examples (so response times 
should  be  short),  (3)  they  should  beneﬁt  from 
automatization  as  the  task  progresses,  until  the  subject 
manages  to  learn  the  other  stimuli  in  which  W  =  0  (so 
response  times  should  improve  over  time),  and  (4)  they 
should be perceived as more typical of the positive category. 
The question is how can we model the induction of such 
efﬁcient rules? First, note that simple statistical associations 
can help the learner select the most diagnostic dimension. 
For instance, by using the Y feature, the subject would get   
correct  responses.  However,  using  the  W  feature,  the 
subject’s score would be better (  correct). Indeed, Z and W 
do  not  match  only  for  the  third  and  fourth  stimuli.  The 
subjects might pick this dimension to start with, and then try 
to  obtain  more  information  about  objects  that  are  not 
correctly  categorized  when  W  =  0.  The  subjects  might 
quickly  notice  that  X  can  help  identifying  the  correct 
category when W = 0. 
Using  information  theory,  this  strategy  might  be 
modeled  as  follows  (I  refer  here  to  ID3  developed  by 
Quinlan,  1986,  and  summarized  in  Mitchell,  1997;  Boden, 
1996;  Luger,  1994).  For  the  UNSPECIFIED  concept,  the 
information content is: 
   
Note that the information content is less than one because 
1’s and 0’s are not equiprobable, which gives the subjects a 
greater  chance  of  guessing  the  right  category  of  an  object 
(more often equal to 1). The effectiveness of an attribute in 
classifying the objects can be measured by the information 
gain that this attribute provides. To obtain the information 
gain  associated  with  using  one  variable,  we  compute  the 
entropy for each attribute of that variable. Let’s begin with 
W. Given W = 0, the entropy is: HW=0 = −( )(−1) − ( )(−1) = 1 
(because half of the objects are positive when W = 0). Given 
W = 1, HW=1 = −( )(−0) = 0 (because all objects are positive 
when W = 1). This means that when using W, there is 1 bit of 
uncertainty left when W = 0 whereas there is no uncertainty 
left when W = 1. Next we compute the mean entropy of the 
above two measures: HW = (HW=0+HW=1) / 2 = (1+0) / 2 = .5, 
which indicates that on average, the learner is left with .5 
bits of uncertainly when using W. 
The information gain for W is: H − HW = .81 − .5 = .31, 
which is larger than H − HY, but equal to H − HX. Let us 
arbitrarily  pick  W  instead  of  X  (since  W  and  X  involve  a 
similar gain in information) and let us focus on the objects 
for  which  some  uncertainty  is  left  (there  is  1  bit  of 
uncertainty left when W = 0). The learner might want to try 
other  dimensions  to  ﬁll  in  this  amount  of  remaining 
uncertainty.  The  information  gain  can  be  computed  in  a 
similar fashion for the four objects left when W = 0. If HX/W=0 
is  the  entropy  left  by  knowing  X  when  W  =  0,  the 
information gain provided by X is HW=0 − HX/W=0 = 1 − 0 = 1, 
meaning that the information gain provided by X reduces 
the uncertainty to zero when W = 0. To sum up, ID3 ﬁrst 
selects  W  as  the  best  attribute  for  having  the  greatest 
number  of  correct  answers  and  then  uses  X  to  make  all 
answers  correct.  In  psychological  terms,  this  means  that 
subjects must always pay attention to W’s features and that 
they must focus in particular on X whenever W = 0. 
Note  that  ID3  does  not  learn  the  list  of  examples  and 
their categories by rote, but rather induces a short deﬁnition 
of  the concept.  The list  of  examples  in  the  UNSPECIFIED 
concept could be represented by a tree made with 8 paths 
(“IF W = 0 and X = 0 and Y = 0, THEN Z = 0”, for the ﬁrst 
path,  and  so  forth).  However,  the  rule  abstracted  by  ID3 
only has three paths: “IF W = 1 THEN Z = 1 (path 1); IF W = 0 
THEN [IF X = 1 THEN Z = 1 (path 2); IF X = 0, THEN Z = 0 
(path  3)]”.  This  is  exactly  the  same  as  inducing  a  short 
deﬁnition  of  a  zebra  from  a  full  description  of  a  list  of 
zebras. 
When  trying  to  learn  a  rule  for  XOR  classiﬁcation, 
computing the information gain is possible but of no help. 
XOR is not compressible with such a technique. Every time 
a  value  of  a  variable  is  kept  constant,  there  is  1  bit  of 
uncertainty  left.  The  minimal  rule  for  XOR  is  “IF  X  =  1 
THEN [IF Y = 1 THEN Z = 0; ELSE IF Y = 0 THEN Z = 1]; 
ELSE IF X = 0 THEN [...]”. Table 1 shows the decision tree 
for this rule. The decision tree being made of four paths, this 
is not really more parsimonious than rote learning of the list 
of  examples  and  their  categories.  Dropping  the  tests  for 
negative examples would simplify the tree, but would not 
change  the  complexity  ranking  of  such  a  concept.  This 
impossibility of compressing XOR tends to argue in favor of 
its high degree of complexity. Nevertheless, I will later show 
that  computing  mutual  information  still  allows  some 
simpliﬁcation in XOR. 
Likewise,  the  Type-VI  concept  –originally  studied  by 
Shepard et al. (1961)– is not compressible, because it is an   21 
 
 
extension of XOR. 
   
Type-VI is made up of two inverted XOR structures (one 
when  W  =  0;  the  other  when  W  =  1).  In  human  learning, 
Type-VI is most often judged to be the most complex of the 
six  3D  Boolean  concepts  that  have  an  equal  number  of 
positive and negative examples (Feldman, 2000; Shepard et 
al., 1961; Nosofsky, Gluck, et al., 1994). Its complexity has 
also  been  observed  in  animal  learning  (J.  D.  Smith  et  al., 
2004).  The  difﬁculty  people  encounter  in  learning  this 
concept can be explained by the complete heterogeneity of 
the categories. For this concept, ID3 produces a decision tree 
of  8  paths,  which  is  shown  in  Table  1  along  with  other 
simpler  decision  trees.  Consistent  with  XOR,  each  time  a 
variable is kept constant, there is 1 bit of uncertainty left. 
This is also true when two variables are held constant: for 
instance, when W = 0 and X = 0, Z is either 1 or 0, so Y is 
necessary to reduce the remaining bit of uncertainty. 
To conclude, learning in ID3 amounts to compressing a 
training sample into a short formula. Following this idea, it 
has sometimes been hypothesized that the compressibility of 
a concept is a measure of its subjective complexity (Feldman, 
2000;  Mathy  &  Bradmetz,  2004;  Lafond,  Lacouture,  & 
Mineau,  2007;  Vigo,  2006).  Note,  however  that  reduction 
technique has many options that have been investigated in 
psychology  and  in  artiﬁcial  intelligence.  In  artiﬁcial 
intelligence, the debate most often concerns the optimality of 
compression algorithms, but debates in psychology focus on 
the  reason  for  the  non-optimality  of  the  rules  induced  by 
individuals (Bradmetz & Mathy, 2008; Lafond et al., 2007). 
In a previous study, we developed a model that accounts for 
the fact that the compression of information in individuals 
results from strictly serial verbal rules (Mathy & Bradmetz, 
2004; Bradmetz & Mathy, 2008) and the limited capacities in 
working  memory,  options  that  would  certainly  not  be 
chosen in artiﬁcial intelligence. 
The  next  section  shows  that  when  considering  the 
various dimensions simultaneously, the learner might ﬁnd 
some  relationships  that  can  considerably  simplify  the 
categorization  process  for  these  apparently  difﬁcult 
concepts. 
Mutual information 
Mutual  information  is  a  measure  of  the  amount  of 
information one can obtain from a given set of variables by 
observing another variable or by observing the relationships 
between  other  variables.  Before  describing  the  main 
formula, note that it is possible to compute the joint entropy 
and  the  conditional  entropy  of  variables.  Joint  entropy  is 
simply the entropy of the set of messages that can be created 
using  several  variables.  For  instance,  using  two  binary 
variables X and Y, it is possible to generate four different 
messages {00, 01, 10, 11}. The messages being equiprobable 
here, there is entropy of 2 bits in this set of messages. In this 
case, where the variables are independent,6 the joint entropy 
is simply the sum of the individual entropies: H(X, Y) = H(X) 
+  H(Y)  =  2.  The  conditional  entropy  H(X/Y)  (the  slash 
indicates the conditional statement “given”) is a measure of 
the amount of information in one variable when another is 
held  constant.  For  instance,  we  have  H(X/Y)  =  1  in  the 
preceding set, because there is 1 bit of uncertainty left on X 
for  any  value  of  Y.  These  notions were  implicit  when we 
computed the information gain above (mainly to make the 
equations more readable). 
Mutual information simply quantiﬁes the relatedness of 
two or more variables. Mutual information corresponds to 
the reduction in the uncertainty about one variable due to 
the knowledge of another variable (see Fass, 2006; Garner, 
1962;  and  Duda,  Hart,  &  Stork,  2001,  pp.  630-632).  The 
mutual information of the two variables is: 
    (2) 
where: 
  .  (3) 
The  variables  used  to  denote  the  mutual  information  are 
separated  by  semicolons  (e.g.,  I(X;  Y))  to  avoid  confusion 
with  the  variables  put  in  conjunction  in  the  joint-entropy 
formula (e.g., H(X, Y)). For any pair of variables in the XOR 
truth table (e.g., X and Y), we get null mutual information. 
For instance: I(X; Y) = H(X) − H(X|Y) = H(X) − (H(X, Y) − 
H(Y)) = 1 − (2 − 1) = 0, meaning that these two variables are 
independent. By applying the same formula to any pair of 
variables, it can be shown that X, Y, and Z are independent. 
Even  if  it  looks  much  more  complicated,  the 
computation of mutual information is easily extendable to 
an  arbitrary  number  of  dimensions  using  alternating  plus 
and  minus  signs  over  all  subsets  of  variables.  For  three 
variables: 
    (4) 
Computed for the three variables in the XOR truth table, 
we have: I(X; Y; Z) = −1 − 1 − 1 + 2 + 2 + 2 − 2 = 1, which 
corresponds to the maximal amount of mutual information 
with three Boolean variables. This means that it is possible 
to  get  the  value  of  a  third  variable  by  knowing  the   22 
 
 
relationship  between  the  other  two  (or  vice  versa). 
Therefore,  the  category  can  be  found  by  knowing  the 
relationships between the two input values. 
In  Table  1,  a  set  of  stimuli  was  generated  using 
combinations of black and white balls. Here, each group of 
horizontally  aligned  balls  represents  a  single  stimulus.  I 
showed earlier that because no feature is characteristic of the 
class in this kind of concept, the learner must either learn a 
complex  rule  (computed,  for  instance,  using  information 
gain) or learn the examples and their respective categories 
by rote memory. However, by using mutual information, we 
can see that the stimuli are positive simply if the balls are of 
different colors, which is clearly more parsimonious. Here, 
the features of one or the other ball are no longer important 
once  one  notices  that  the  relation  “different”  between  the 
two balls overrides the particular feature values. 
This  relational  complexity  can  be  demonstrated  in  a 
Bayesian network (Fig. 1), which indicates that variables 1 
and 2 are two independent causes of the variable “Class” 
(see Glymour, 2001; Pearl, 2000).7 However, as speciﬁed in 
the network, the two variables are not independent, given 
the  class.  Clearly,  knowing  that  the  class  is  positive,  it 
follows  that  variables  1  and  2  necessarily  have  different 
values.  This  is  a  case  of  a  rather  complex  notion  called 
conditional nonindependence. 
Similarly, for the Type-VI concept, mutual information is 
Table 1. XOR and TYPE-VI concepts 
 
 
 
Note. Each group of horizontally aligned balls represents a single stimulus. Column C indicates the category membership. 
Mutual Info., mutual information. Num. Info, numerical information. Decision tree 1: “IF first ball is white, THEN -; IF first
ball is black, THEN +”. Decision tree 2: “IF first ball is white, THEN [IF second ball is white, THEN -; IF second ball is black, 
THEN +]; IF first ball is black, THEN [IF second ball is black, THEN -; IF second ball is white, THEN +]”. Decision tree 3: 
similar to decision tree 2, except that the third level indicates the color of the third ball. Decision tree 4: “IF the color of the 
two balls is Same, THEN -; IF the color of the balls is Different, THEN +”. Decision tree 5: “IF first ball is white, THEN [IF the 
color of the other balls is Same, THEN -; IF the color of the other balls is Different, then +]; IF first ball is black, THEN [IF the 
color of the other balls is Different, THEN -; IF the color of the other balls is Same, then +]”. Decision tree 6: “IF the number of 
black balls is even, THEN -; ELSE +”.   23 
 
 
also equal to 1. This means that it is possible to know the 
value of a given variable, given the relationship between the 
other three (or vice versa). Mutual information is maximal in 
Type-VI  because  there  is  an  XOR  structure  with  three 
variables for any value of the fourth variable. Therefore, the 
category  can  be  determined  by  knowing  the  relationships 
between the three input values. Consistent with XOR, Type-
VI apparently has no critical feature, thereby imposing rote 
memorization of the four positive examples. However, using 
mutual information, one can see that whenever the second 
and  third  balls  are  of  different  colors  –when  the  ﬁrst  is 
white– or whenever they are of the same color –when the 
ﬁrst  is  black–  the  example  is  positive.  Such  higher-order 
rules might facilitate learning of the Type-VI classiﬁcation. 
The structure of information is even more intriguing in Type-
VI: what was true for the ﬁrst ball is also true for the second 
and third (for instance, if the third ball is white, the stimulus 
is  positive  whenever  the  other  two  balls  are  of  different 
colors, and so on). 
In sum, mutual information allows subjects to reduce the 
complexity of the decision rules as follows: In XOR, subjects 
can  use  a  two-path  decision  tree  (IF  balls  are  of  different 
colors, THEN +; ELSE IF balls are the same color THEN -”. 
In Type-VI, subjects can use a four-path decision tree (tree 
number 4 in Table 1: “IF ﬁrst ball is white THEN [IF other 
balls are of different colors, THEN +; ELSE IF other balls are 
the same color THEN -]; ELSE IF ﬁrst ball is black THEN [IF 
other  balls  are  of  different  colors, THEN  -;  ELSE  IF  other 
balls are the same color THEN +”. This rule can be reduced 
to “If ﬁrst is white and other balls are of different colors, or if 
ﬁrst is black and other balls are the same color” for positive 
examples. The diagonal arrows in Table 1 show that more 
compressed rules correspond to rules of a lower level. 
It has been shown that correlations between features can 
be  learned  during  classiﬁcation  tasks,  even  incidentally 
(Giguère, Lacroix, & Larochelle, 2007, although the subjects 
in  this  study  only  learned  attributes  that  were  perfectly 
correlated),  but  mutual  information  may  be  less  apparent 
(Fass, 2006). For instance, when stimuli are more complex 
and  have  incommensurate  dimensions  (e.g.,  compound 
Figure 1. The exclusive disjunction and three possible corresponding Bayesian networks. Note. The truth table includes two 
input variables and one output variable. The output variable is called the class or the category in the categorization 
literature. The top right Bayesian network shows that input 1 and input 2 are independent. However, in this network, input 
1 is NOT conditionally independent of input 2, GIVEN the class. Indeed, the value of input 2 is equal to the value of input 1 
if the class is 0, whereas input 1 and input 2 are inversely correlated if the class is 1. Therefore, one can correctly classify the 
examples of an XOR by considering the relationships between the two input values. The same properties would follow if we 
permuted the variables in the network. In other words, if any two variables are the same, the third is equal to zero, whereas 
if any two variables are different, the third is equal to one. 
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stimuli such as big blue triangles, small red squares, etc.), 
mutual information can be available but needs to be used by 
subjects in a more complex manner than when the stimuli 
are like those shown in Table 1, where the relationships are 
obvious. For compound stimuli, mutual information can be 
used by reversing a subrule from one condition to another. 
For instance, a Type-VI concept can be simpliﬁed as follows: 
when  the  objects  are  small,  the  red  squares  and  the  blue 
triangles are positive, whereas when the objects are large, 
these objects are negative. The subject then has to memorize 
half of the decision paths and switch the leaves, given the 
size of the objects. 
Necessarily,  this  assumes  that  the  subject  has  already 
built a correct decision tree before noticing the symmetries, 
which explains why it has been shown that the utilization of 
mutual information in categorization tasks can only operate 
in the long run (see Mathy, In press). Finally, note that in 
Table 1, the stimuli are so peculiar that subjects can devise a 
much more abstract and efﬁcient strategy using numerical 
information.  For  instance,  by  noticing  that  the  stimuli  are 
positive  whenever  the  number  of  balls  in  the  stimulus  is 
odd,  the  subject  can  formulate  a  highly  compressed  two-
path decision for both XOR and Type-VI concepts (trees 4 
and 6 in Table 1). This strategy is also available when the 
stimuli are compound: knowing that the little blue triangle 
is  a  positive  stimulus  in  a  Type-VI  structure,  another 
stimulus  is  positive  whenever  a  stimulus  has  only  one 
feature  in  common  with  the  little  blue  triangle.  Again, 
subjects can reduce their decision rule to two paths (if there 
is one feature in common with the little blue triangle, then 
positive, else negative). 
Conclusion 
Decision-trees in concept learning 
Entropy, information gain, and mutual information are 
basic  notions  in  information  theory.  They  can  be  used  to 
model  rule  formation  in  concept-learning  tasks,  and  to 
assess  the  subjective  complexity  of  a  given  task  and 
difﬁculty  in  classifying  instances.  The  idea  that  learning 
involves the extraction of relevant information followed by 
gradual  testing  of  hypotheses  has  considerable  intuitive 
appeal.  I  suggest  here  that  because  rule  formation  in 
individuals  functions  by  an  information  compression 
process  (by  starting  small  and  seeking  parsimony), 
individual  performance  can  be  measured  by  the 
compressibility of the information inherent in the conceptual 
structures,  and  compressibility  itself  can  be  expressed  in 
terms  of  the  minimal,  ordered  decision  tree  for  a  given 
concept. Similar modeling based on information reduction 
has been helpful in other domains, for instance, to explain 
automatization in visual-memory search tasks via a process 
of information reduction achieved by ignoring features that 
are  not  diagnostic  to  the  search  (Cousineau  &  Larochelle, 
2004). 
Many  hybrid  models  recognize  the  importance  of 
specifying a mechanism for combining rule- and exemplar-
based representations (Anderson & Betz, 2001; Erickson & 
Kruschke,  1998;  Goodman,  Tenenbaum,  Feldman,  & 
Grifﬁths,  2008;  Rosseel,  2002;  Pothos,  2005;  E.  E.  Smith  & 
Sloman,  1994).  Indeed,  the  use  of  both  processes  is 
supported  by  recent  advances  in  cognitive  neuroscience 
(Ashby  &  Ell,  2001).  There  are  also  numerous  other 
concurrent  models  of  categorization  –based  on  other 
paradigms–  which  also  deserve  serious  consideration 
(Ashby & Maddox, 1993; Ashby, Alfonso-Reese, Turken, & 
Waldron, 1998; Kruschke, 1992; Lamberts, 2000; Nosofsky, 
1984; Nosofsky, Gluck, et al., 1994). In this paper, I advocate 
the  development  of  rule-based  models  by  focusing  on 
putative  relationships  between  subjective  complexity  and 
decision-tree complexity. This view is supported by recent 
experimental research in which learning times, error rates, 
and  response  times  were  used  to  assess  subjective 
complexity. One possibility is that subjects need more time 
to  discover  and  to  form  correct  decision  rules  when  the 
structure  of  the  task-related  information  is  more  complex 
(Mathy  &  Bradmetz,  2004;  Feldman,  2000;  Lafond  et  al., 
2007;  Nosofsky,  Palmeri,  &  McKinley,  1994).  Another 
possibility is that the smallest number of steps required to 
reach a given leaf in a decision tree for a given stimulus is 
directly proportional to response time (Bradmetz & Mathy, 
2008; Lafond et al., 2009; Trabasso, Rollins, & Shaughnessy, 
1971). The principal difference between these recent studies 
and  those  of  the  last  century  is  that  (1)  better 
characterization of reduction techniques has been sought to 
account  for  how  subjects  manage  to  learn8  (2)  the 
plausibility  of  the  information-reducing  mechanisms  and 
the  tractability  of  the  computations  required  during  the 
reduction process have been better discussed, and (3) better 
measures of ﬁt and broader experimental studies have been 
used to assess these different rule-based models. 
Psychological plausibility 
There are several classical methods of concept learning 
using rules based on information reduction. One might be 
reluctant  to  bring  back  to  life  an  old-fashioned  class  of 
models based on simple decision trees (e.g., Hunt, Marin, & 
Stone, 1966) which have encountered many obstacles since 
their  development.  Firstly,  such  models  often  subsume 
verbal or consciously penetrable strategies, whereas recent 
research provides evidence of less-verbal, implicit processes 
in categorization in some cases. Secondly, these models may   25 
 
 
appear quite crude in that they do not allow for ﬁne tuning 
of  parameters  to  achieve  greater  precision  in  modeling  (a 
counter  example  is  RULEX,  which  is  presented  below).  A 
third reason is that certain predictions in rule-based models 
(e.g., assessing task complexity) can be easily mimicked by 
other models such as exemplar models, which are also very 
powerful  in  many  other  respects  (Nosofsky,  Gluck,  et  al., 
1994). However, my goal was to show that perhaps more 
elaborate,  rule-based  models  are  worthy  of  serious 
consideration in psychology. 
I  will  now  discuss  the  plausibility  of  the  notions 
presented  in  this  paper  and  the  optimality  with  which 
subjects abstract relevant information. I posit that subjects 
can  compute  relevant  information  and  build  a  minimal 
decision  rule  using  simple  strategies,  and  that  these 
strategies can be accounted for by computing information 
gain  and  mutual  information.  For  subjects,  computing 
information  gain  is  equivalent  to  holding  one  dimension 
constant  while  globally  assessing  the  number  of  correct 
responses obtained during the classiﬁcation. Once subjects 
notice  that  they  –statistically–  get  most  responses  if  they 
hold  a  particular  dimension  constant  (rather  than  some 
other  dimension),  they  can  start  using  this  dimension 
systematically  in  order  to  separate  the  stimuli  into  two 
broad clusters. This process does not require much mental 
effort. The subject can simply try, for instance, to put all red 
pictures  in  Category  A,  and  all  blue  ones  in  Category  B. 
Assuming that most of their responses are correct, subjects 
select the dimension and then repeat the same strategy for 
the remaining incorrect classiﬁed instances. The dimensions 
are  simply  embedded  by  subjects  until  no  uncertainly 
remains.  It  follows  that  the  absence  of  trial-by-trial 
information  for  computing  information  gain  is  not 
necessarily  a  drawback  for  modeling  subject  strategies. 
Sayeki  (1969)  found,  for  instance,  that  subjects  performed 
nearly optimally when required to ask as few questions as 
possible in order to identify one of the six classes assigned to 
100  cards  with  classes  and  features  that  have  different 
frequencies. All subjects used highly ordered efﬁcient trees 
corresponding to optimal decision rules.9 
Difﬁculty  elaborating  complex  decisions  about 
exceptions might explain why subjects struggle when trying 
to  classify  exceptions.10  Their  difﬁculty  may  be  caused  by 
working  memory  limitations,  which  could  prevent  them 
from  building  or  using  an  overly  complex  decision 
structure. In a previous paper, we argued that a decision-
tree building process clearly depends on working memory 
capacity (Mathy & Bradmetz, 2004) (see also Lewandowsky, 
in  press,  who  showed  that  working  memory  capacity  is 
crucial  to  categorization).  In  the  multi-agent  model  of 
working memory that we developed, there is no need for a 
conductor  (a  central  executive).  Agents  have  very  limited 
capacities for retaining information or organizing it, but they 
can  nevertheless  use  basic  communication  processes  to 
exchange information. A minimal decision tree can be built 
via an inter-agent communication process that promotes the 
elaboration  of  common  knowledge  (knowledge  about 
stimuli  and  categories)  from  distributed  knowledge 
(knowledge  about  features).  The  communication  priorities 
simply  depend  on  the  information  gain  provided  by  the 
different agents. Our hypothesis was that the complexity of 
a decision tree can be determined by that of the multi-agent 
communication protocol. The number of agents that have to 
be held in working memory is limited simply because of the 
complexity  of  their  interactions,  which  grows  intractably 
with  their  number.  This  kind  of  gradual  adaptation  (i.e., 
agents,  features  are  recruited  one  by  one)  captures  the 
notions of learnability and the importance of starting small 
(Elman,  1993),  in  line  with  Gold’s  (1967)  procedure  of 
identication  in  the  limit,  the  cascade-correlation  algorithm 
for neural networks (Fahlman & Lebiere, 1990), the RULEX 
model  (Nosofsky,  Gluck,  et  al.,  1994)  and  the  SUSTAIN 
model of category learning (in which clusters are recruited 
gradually,  Love,  Medin,  &  Gureckis,  2004).  These  models 
are  opposed  to  those  involving  pruning,  which  posit  that 
learning  progresses  from  the  most  speciﬁc  and  complex 
decisions to the simplest ones. 
Extracting  mutual  information  is  also  psychologically 
plausible,  although  it  has  been  shown  that  subject’s 
sensitivity to mutual information can be very limited (Fass, 
2006).  Mutual  information,  also  called  transinformation, 
measures the amount of information that can be obtained 
about one variable by observing other variables or relations 
between them. Other studies have shown that categorization 
learning can be guided by knowledge drawn from people’s 
tacit understanding of causal relations, which explains why 
people  can  learn  categories  on  the  basis  of  feature 
correlations (Rehder & Hastie, 2001; Waldmann, Holyoak, & 
Fratianne, 1995; Waldmann, Meder, Sydow, & Hagmayer, in 
press).  In  some  of  the  situations  described  in  this  paper, 
there  are  symmetries  in  two,  apparently  complex  sets  of 
decisions that can be used to form simpler rules. This can 
considerably  simplify  the  learning  process  by  halving  the 
decision  structure  and  resulting  in  performance  gains. 
Mutual  information  is  a  non-metric  tool  enabling  one  to 
measure  the  complexity  of  relationships  between  features. 
Mutual information simply quantiﬁes how certain features 
relate to each other. In various categorization models, Type-
VI concepts are unanimously judged to be the most complex 
kind  of  3D  Boolean  concepts.  This  has  been  largely 
conﬁrmed  by  empirical  data,  but  it  is  apparently 
inconsistent  with  the  fact  that  this  concept  entails  more   26 
 
 
mutual  information  than  any  other  3D  Boolean  concept. 
Conﬁrming  this  apparent  paradox,  I  showed  that  subjects 
are  able  to  gradually  learn  Type-VI  concepts  faster  than 
other  Shepardian  concepts  such  as  Type  IV,  which  are 
supposedly  less  difﬁcult  than  Type  VI  (Mathy,  In  press). 
Type-IV concepts have consistently been found to be easier 
than  Type-VI  ones  (when  the  concepts  are  learned  once). 
Using repeated measures, I pointed out that learning several 
classiﬁcations  of  the  same  type  in  succession  has  a 
substantial  impact  on  how  concepts  are  learned.  By 
comparing Type-VI concepts (entailing a maximal amount 
of  positive  mutual  information)  with  Type-IV  concepts 
(entailing  a  minimal  amount  of  positive  mutual 
information),  the  results  showed  that  Type-VI  concepts 
gradually  became  more  learnable  than  Type-IV  ones 
(Shepard et al., 1961, made the same observation, but in a 
less  controlled  experimental  setting).  Mutual  information 
hence emphasizes the peculiar status of Type VI and might 
also account for other Type-VI effects that have been noted 
in  studies  on  inductive  biases  and  cultural  evolution 
(Grifﬁths, Christian, & Kalish, 2008). Another study showed 
that  when  initial  learning  pertains  to  a  Type-II  structure 
(XOR with a third irrelevant dimension, which also entails 
some mutual information in the two relevant dimensions), a 
reversal  shift  is  easier  than  shifts  based  on  a  single, 
previously relevant dimension, or shifts based on a single, 
previously irrelevant dimension (Kruschke, 1996). Such an 
effect also tends to support the hypothesis that individuals 
can  easily  derive  new  rules  based  on  reversed  decisions. 
Because individuals can effectively use mutual information 
in  the  long  run  to  devise  easier  strategies  for  category 
learning,  categorization  models  should  include  every 
possible way for subjects to simplify a categorization task. 
Another example of cases where people easily reverse rules 
has been studied using the intra-extra dimensional set shift 
paradigm. When children have to switch from one sorting 
rule to another, they have more trouble when they need to 
change the relevant dimension (the classiﬁcation is based on 
shape, then  on  color)  than when  they have  to  change the 
value of the relevant dimension (the classiﬁcation is based 
on shape only, ﬁrst with rabbits in category A and cars in 
category B, and then with rabbits in category B and cars in 
category A) (Perner & Lang, 2002). 
A comparison with RULEX 
There  are  always  alternative  ways  of  describing  any 
category  structure  in  terms  of  rules,  logic  formulae,  or 
decision trees, and controversy certainly exists about exactly 
what form of abstraction is the one subjects are most likely 
to adopt (Mathy & Bradmetz, 2004; Feldman, 2000; Lafond 
et al., 2007). Still, there is agreement on the fact that subjects 
perform more or less optimally in reducing the total amount 
of information. Overall, subjects have less trouble learning 
homogeneous  categories  that  can  be  covered  by  simple 
rules, which can be tracked by fast and accurate learning. 
Learning  in  RULEX  (rule-plus-exception  learning  model, 
Nosofsky,  Palmeri,  &  McKinley,  1994)  differs  in  several 
ways from the notions introduced in the present paper. 
1.  In  RULEX,  categorization  decisions  are  made  by 
sequentially  verifying  stored  one-dimensional  rules, 
conjunctive rules, and exceptions, whereas in a decision tree, 
there is a single veriﬁcation process which tests the features 
ordered  in  a  given  decision  tree.  The  distinction  between 
rules and exceptions breaks down in a decision tree. Even 
though it is possible to consider that the difference between 
rules  and  exceptions  merely  depends  on  the  number  of 
feature tests, it is better to simply consider that one decision 
tree  represents  one  rule,  which  can  be  simple  or  complex 
depending on its structure. 
2. A more radical difference in the classiﬁcation decision 
process is that RULEX ﬁrst checks for all exceptions stored 
in memory, and if no exceptions apply, a check is made on 
simpler  rules  (going  from  the  most  speciﬁc  to  the  most 
general). However, the sequence of hypothesis-testing stages 
is  reversed:  ﬁrst  there  is  a  search  for  perfect  single-
dimension  rules,  imperfect  single-dimension  rules,  and 
conjunctive rules, and then there is a search for exceptions if 
each  of  the  other  steps  failed.  In  more  classical  decision 
trees,  the  classiﬁcation  decisions  follow  the  tree-building 
process.  First,  simple  dimensions  are  tested  to  induce  a 
simple  rule.  If  one  dimension  is  not  sufﬁcient,  other 
dimensions can be added to gain precision. Similarly, when 
a  stimulus  is  presented,  the  decision  process  follows  the 
same order, testing for the ﬁrst dimension, then the second if 
the ﬁrst dimension leads to uncertainty. 
3.  RULEX  is  quite  ad  hoc,  since  it  is  intended  to  be 
psychologically plausible. Because it allows for the tuning of 
numerous parameters, the space of predictions can contain a 
substantial number of possibilities, and predictions can only 
be  found  through  time-consuming  simulations.  Navarro 
(2005)  outlined  a  formalization  of  RULEX  using  basic 
probability theory and simple combinatorics to calculate its 
predictions faster. Still, he showed, for instance, that there 
can  be  12  different  patterns  of  results  for  ranking  the  six 
Shepardian concepts from Type I to Type VI. In contrast, a 
given decision-tree model predicts analytic expressions most 
often resulting in single patterns for ranking a given set of 
concepts.  It  is  only  by  considering  different  decision-tree 
models  that  it  is  possible  to  obtain  different  patterns  for 
ranking a given set of concepts. These patterns can then be 
compared to subjects’ performance to gain insight into the 
mechanisms that underpin the categorization process. The   27 
 
 
one-to-one  function  facilitates  the  rejection  of  a  model, 
whereas in RULEX, the probability of accepting the model is 
greater.  For  instance,  in  two  previous  studies  (Mathy  & 
Bradmetz, 2004; Bradmetz & Mathy, 2008), we tried to show 
that the computation of entropy combined to a multi-agent 
model of categorization (which can be parameterized more 
or  less  in  a  sequential  versus  parallel  way)  can  help 
determines the degree of optimality reached by individuals 
in  learning  decision  rules.  Given  that  the  different 
parameterizations of the multi-agent model led to different 
rankings  of  complexity,  we  were  able  to  determine  that 
subjects  tended  to  use  information  in  an  overly  strict 
sequential manner, a process which slows down the decision 
process and sometimes make subjects form longer rules than 
necessary. 
However, RULEX shares one interesting property with 
the decision-tree model presented in Bradmetz and Mathy 
(2008), also designed to be psychologically plausible. Both 
models predict that individuals vary in the particular rules 
they  form  and  that  averaged  classiﬁcation  data  are 
presumed to represent a mixture of idiosyncratic rules. For 
instance, let us imagine that blue triangles, blue squares, and 
red triangles are positive, whereas red squares are negative. 
The minimal formula is known to be blue OR triangle, which 
is  isomorphic  to  a  decision  tree  such  as  ”IF  blue  then 
positive; IF triangle THEN positive” (Feldman, 2000; Lafond 
et al., 2007). The corresponding decision tree is polythetic, in 
that multiple attribute values can label each tree branch. In 
this case, the branch for categorizing the positive instances 
can be labelled blue or triangle. This minimal formula implies 
that the three positive objects require the same amount of 
computation  to  be  categorized,  so  the  response  times  are 
expected  to  be  similar  for  those  objects.  The  reason  why 
most psychological models are not worried about polythetic 
decisions is certainly because psychological experiments do 
not use a large number of dimensions, but such trees are 
almost  never  used  in  artiﬁcial  intelligence,  for  complexity 
reasons (Duda et al., 2001). In one of the multi-agent models 
we  developed,  which  is  based  on  the  computation  of 
information gain, the decision trees are monothetic because it 
is hypothesized that the order in which information is used 
in working memory is constant. In this case, given that the 
shape  dimension  and  the  color  dimension  are  equally 
informative about the class, subjects could either induce the 
rule “IF blue THEN positive; IF red THEN [IF triangle THEN 
positive]”, or the rule “IF triangle THEN positive; IF square 
THEN [IF blue THEN positive]”. Again these decision trees 
are  less  optimal  than  polythetic  ones  because  subjects  are 
thought  to  use  information  in  an  overly  strict  sequential 
manner. Here, the blue triangles could be categorized using 
one  piece  of  information  by  all  the  subjects,  whereas  the 
other  two  positive  instances  were  categorized  by  some 
subjects using a single piece of information and categorized 
by the rest of the subjects using two pieces of information 
(the  mean  response  time  for  these  two  instances  was 
therefore predicted to depend on 1.5 pieces of information). 
Our results showed that the time of access to the categories 
was related to these numbers of pieces of information. The 
blue triangle therefore acquired a prototype-like status, and 
overall, the mean classiﬁcation pattern of the positive and 
negative instances was typical of the one predicted by the 
exemplar  model.  However,  the  prediction  was  made 
without relying on similarity as an explanatory principle. 
Directions for future research 
The present model proved useful both for accounting for 
subjective complexity across concept learning-tasks and for 
modeling response-time variability within concept-learning 
tasks. A couple of unsolved problems should be addressed 
in  future  research.  Although  attention  allocation  to 
dimensions  can  be  inferred  from  the  rules  induced  by 
subjects  (since  the  most  attractive  dimension  is  generally 
chosen  as  the  ﬁrst  dimension  to  test  in  a  tree,  whenever 
several  dimensions  are  equally  informative),  decision-tree 
models would beneﬁt from incorporating a typical form of 
dimension  weighting  to  indicate  the  importance  of  the 
features. In addition, the absence of trial-by-trial information 
in the notions I presented poses a problem. Information gain 
and mutual information were computed here on whole sets 
of  stimuli.  Because  the  testing  phase  in  concept-formation 
tasks  appears  to  involve  trial-by-trial  tests  (subjects  seek 
evidence  to  test  their  hypothesis  for  every  single 
presentation  of  a  stimulus),  a  better  approximation  of 
subjects’  performance  could  be  targeted  by  deﬁning  how 
information is used trial by trial. 
A critical problem for future research is integrating all 
possible  strategies  that  subjects  might  use  to  facilitate  the 
categorization task. I have shown here that despite the fact 
that  mutual  information  is  available  to  subjects,  it  can 
mostly  only  be  used  in  the  long  term,  once  subjects  have 
acquired expertise in the task. As the categorization process 
progresses, similarity can certainly also be used by subjects 
to exhaust any available strategy or to make faster decisions. 
Pruning could also be used once subjects notice analogies in 
the  decisions,  provided  non-optimal  decisions  have  been 
reached  at  one  point.  Overly  monolithic  models  must 
therefore  be  proscribed  in  order  to  incorporate  all 
possibilities available to subjects for efﬁcient learning. One 
cannot obtain a real measure of the complexity of a concept 
until  every  possible  strategy  for  reducing  redundant 
information  has  been  taken  into  account,  assuming  that 
subjects are as versatile as they can be.   28 
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1 His argument was that the memory span is limited in the 
number of chunks (7) it can retain, but not in the number of 
bits, thus showing that short-term memory does not ﬁt with 
a model of channel capacity. Luce (2003) gives an interesting 
historical account of the shift away from information theory 
in psychology after the 1960s. 
2 The expected value (i.e., the “mean”) for a random variable 
is E(X) =  , where i stands for all values that can be 
taken on by the random variable. For instance, if someone 
ﬂips  a  coin  to  either  win  2  dollars  or  lose  2  dollars,  the 
expected value for the variable is E(X) = (.5)(2) + (.5)(−2) = 0. 
3  Also,  again,  H  corresponds  to  the  number  of  binary 
questions one would need to ask to retrieve the content of a 
single  message.  For  the  categories,  there  would  be  three 
questions (rounding 2.8 to 3): Is the category less than or 
equal to 4? If so, Is the category less than or equal to 2? If so, 
Is the category equal to 1? 
4 The study of when and what concepts are formed, and via 
what  process  at  the  ontogenetic  or  sociogenetic  levels  is 
called epistemology 
5 Occam’s razor also applies to models (Hélie, 2006; Pitt & 
Myung, 2002; Roberts & Pashler, 2000), which should be as 
simple as possible, an argument that is often put forward by 
those who advocate rule-based models. 
6  I  am  referring  here  to  the  notion  of  independence  of 
probabilities, such as p(X/Y) = p(X). 
7 A peculiar property of XOR is that relational complexity is 
maximal,  which  means  that  the  three  variables  can  be 
permuted, and any of them can act as the class, because as 
long as the other two are different, the third is equal to one. 
As a result, three Bayes nets could be drawn from the truth 
table depicted in Fig. 1. 
8 Different techniques such as C4.5, or C5 –also developed 
by  Quinlan,  for  instance,  to  improve  algorithms  for 
continuous  or  missing  data–  or  OBDDs  have  been 
developed in artiﬁcial intelligence, and some of them may 
have  inspired  psychologists  (for  an  overview  of  such 
techniques, see Duda et al., 2001, Chap. 8, and Ruth & Ryan, 
2000, Chap. 6). However, such adjunctions to ID3 are not so 
useful for the simple tasks described in this paper. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                             
9 In Sayeki’s experiment, in which the categories were not 
equiprobable, the Shannon-Fano encoding theory was used 
to  evaluate  the  optimality  of  the  decision  trees  used  by 
subjects. The Shannon-Fano encoding procedure is usually 
helpful when a set of symbols (e.g., the class labels) have 
different  frequencies  but  no  underlying  deﬁning  features. 
However,  the  procedure  may  not  be  helpful  when  the 
objects  are  already  encoded  by  a  set  of  features.  Sayeki 
experimented with objects whose features perfectly matched 
the  codes  produced  by  the  Shannon-Fano  algorithm.  This 
gave  the  illusion  that  subjects  could  easily  transpose  the 
optimal set of codes to the set of features that characterized 
the  objects.  For  instance,  68  objects  labelled  F  could  be 
recoded  0  while  the  other  32  objects  could  be  recoded  1. 
Because all F objects were green and other objects were red 
(by  construction),  the  decision  tree  for  recoding  the  class 
labels  according  to  frequency  paralleled  the  feature  codes 
(see Experiment 1, Deck 1, p. 272). However, this procedure 
is not helpful for the examples developed in this paper. For 
instance, in an XOR structure where a white square and a 
black circle are labelled A, and a black square and a white 
circle are labelled B, the Shannon-Fanno encoding procedure 
would code both As as 0 and both Bs as 1, since the labels 
are equiprobable. However, such encoding would not be of 
any help when the learner needs to identify the class of an 
object  given  its  features.  In  the  XOR  case,  the  minimal 
encoding of objects requires an average bit number of 2 bits 
per object, not 1. Whenever objects are already encoded by 
features, the computation of information gain is required. 
10  Exemplar  models  simply  state  that  exceptions  are more 
difﬁcult  to  handle  because  of  their  few  similarities  to  the 
majority of objects belonging to the same category. 